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IN THE SUPREME COURT 
OF THE STATE OF UTAH 
JAYLYN EATON, a Minor, by and 
through her Guardian ad Litem, 
JAY H. EATON, 
Plaintiff and Appellant, 
vs. 
LEON H. SAVAGE and 
PAULA SAVAGE, his wife, 
Defendants and Respondents. 
Case No. 
12814 
APPELLANT'S BRIEF 
STATEMENT OF KIND OF CASE 
This is an appeal from a summary judgment dated 
January 6, 1972 signed by James S. Sawaya, District Judge. 
The plaintiff's complaint alleges that the defendants, as 
owners of apartment buildings, were negligent in install-
ing and maintaining pipe railing on their premises in the 
area where children were authorized and known to play, 
over which the plaintiff minor fell, sustaining permanent 
crippling injuries. The complaint further alleges that 
the pipe railing was highly dangerous, was a nuisance and 
served no useful purpose. 
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DISPOSITION IN LOWER COURT 
In the lower court the judge granted a motion of 
counsel for the respondents for summary judgment on the 
grounds that the pleadings raised no genuine issue as to 
any material fact, and that the defendants were entitled 
to a judgment as a matter of law. The motion was based 
on the files and records of the court and the depositions of 
the parties which had been taken at that time. 
RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL 
Appellant seeks a reversal of the summary judgment 
of the district court, and for a right to be granted a jury 
trial so that the actual issues presented by the pleadings . 
and depositions can be submitted to a jury for final de· 
termination. This right is granted to appellant by the 
Constitution of the State of Utah, Article 1, Section 10. 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
In her deposition, the defendant Leon Savage testi· 
fied that he was the owner of the apartments consisting 
of 16 units (four fourplexes). That the pipe railings were 
installed in 1964 or 1965 around the sidewalks, using 
3/4" pipe. Many of the railings had been recemented dur· 1 
ing April prior to the accident as they had become un· 
stable. The railings were installed 15" above the ground 
and were put in to help the grass grow. He was on the 
premises 365 days a year, observed a lot of children play· 
ing in the front yard area, and that there were a lot of ' 
children among his tenants that were allowed to play in 
the front yard area whenever they chose. Following the 
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accident the defendants removed some of the railings, 
feeling that it would increase their chances of selling the 
apartments, and that it would be better if they were taken 
out, and that the main reason for taking them out was to 
improve the looks of the apartments. (Deposition of Leon 
Savage, p. 3-12.) 
The plaintiff minor, Jaylyn Eaton, in her deposition 
testified that she was 13 years old at the time of the acci-
dent. (p. 4). On the day of injury she was acting as a baby-
sitter for one of the tenants of the apartments (p 6). Many 
times prior to that day she had visited girls friends and 
played in the apartment house area and it was a common 
practice for her and her friends to play on the railings 
bordering the sidewalk (p 8). Others had fallen from the 
bars, skinned their knees and things like that. She had 
been walking a four year old child, whom she was tending, 
on the bars for about ten minutes. She describes the ac-
tivity thusly: 
"She was walking on the bars and I was hold-
ing her hand and she would let go and walk, and 
then she would take hold of my hand again. And 
she went to fall away from me and I went to grab 
her and I just fell over the bars." 
When asked if the railing was solid, she testified that 
it was kind of wiggly, and that she had determined that 
sometimes before the accident (p 9-11). She stated that 
when the child fell she fell in trying to grab and get hold 
of her and they fell together over the bar (p 13). She was 
taken to the hospital by ambulance where she underwent 
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hip surgery which was followed by another hospitalization 
in January (p 17-19). When asked if children still walked 
on the railing she answered: 
"I don't know, once in awhile they did before 
they took the railings down and they would scream 
at them, so now they don't anymore." (p 26). 
Carol Eaton, mother of the plaintiff minor, testified 
that she had hollered at all the kids while playing on the 
bars because she knew they could get hurt (p 3). She had 1 
been informed by the doctors that plaintiff might have to 
remain on crutches or even be put in a brace, and that she 
could have trouble with her hip for the rest of her life 
(p 5 ), and that she would probably require future surgery 
more than once (p 7). She testified that none of the pipe 
railings were in very solid, and that one section was so 
loose it could be lifted out of the ground and they were 
a hazard (p 7, 8). 
ARGUMENT 
POINT NO. I 
THE COMPLAINT STATED AV AUD CAUSE 
OF ACTION WHICH WAS SUPPORTED BY 
THE FACTS SET FORTH IN THE DISPOSI-
TIONS, AND THE LOWER COURT ERRED 
IN GRANTING THE MOTION FOR SUM-
MARY JUDGMENT. 
In the case of EDLER v. SEPULVEDA PARK 
APARTMENTS (Cal.) 297 P.2d 508 the landlord had ex· ' 
cavated small holes around sprinkler heads to facilitate 
watering the grass. The hole was about six inches in 
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-diameter and three inches in depth extending about two 
inches in width beyond the sprinkler head. A small child 
suffered a broken leg when his foot caught in the hole. 
The jury found for the defendant, and plaintiff was grant-
ed a new trial. The court said: 
"That one is negligent in maintaining an 
agency which he knows or reasonably should know 
to be dangerous to children of tender years at a 
place where he knows or reasonably should know 
such children are likely to resort, or to which they 
are likely to be attracted by the agency, unless 
he exercises reasonable care to guard them against 
danger which their ignorance and youth prevent 
them from appreciating. If, to the knowledge of 
the owner, children of tender years habitually come 
on his property where this dangerous condition 
exists to which they are exposed, the duty to exer-
cise reasonable care for their safety arises, not be-
cause of the implied invitation but because of the 
owner's knowledge of unconscious exposure to 
danger which the children do not realize. Children 
of tender years have no foresight and scarcely any 
apprehensiveness of danger, a circumstance which 
those owning instrumentalities potential for harm 
must bear in mind; for it is every individual's duty 
to use toward others such due care as the situation 
then and there requires . . . The Restatement says 
'a possessor of land is subject to liability for bodily 
harm to young children trespassing thereon caused 
by a structure or other artificial condition which 
he maintains upon the land if (a) the place where 
the condition is maintained is one upon which 
the possessor knows, or should know, that such 
children are likely to trespass, and (b) the condi-
tion is one of which the possessor knows, or should 
know, and which he realizes, or should realize, as 
involving an unreasonable risk of death or serious 
; 
bodily harm to such children, and (c) the children 
because of their youth do not discover the condition 
or realize the risk involved in intermeddling with 
it or in coming within the area made dangerous by 
it, and (d) the utility to the possessor of maintain-
ing the condition is slight as compared to the risk 
to young children involved therein.' See 65 C.J.S. 
Negligence Section 228 Page 454. The rule in 
California is substantially as stated in the Restate-
ment." 
The order granting the new trial was affirmed. The 
principle of the foregoing California case and of the Re-
statement of the Law of Torts discussed with approval in 
that case would apply a fortiori in the case at bar in which 
the plaintiff minor was an invitee and not a trespasser. 
To the same effect is GARDNER v. STONESTORM 
CORP. (Cal.) 302 P.2d 674 where a contractor had install-
ed a temporary plank ramp to wheel concrete over an area 
connected with a children's playground of an apartment 
building. A child's foot was caught in the crack between 
the plank, causing her to fall and be injured. The court 
in that case said: 
" The jury could have found that Stone· 
storm knew or should have known of the character 
of the ramp's construction and that children would 
and did play upon it. Such findings would be suf· 
ficient to place liability upon Stonestorm for the 
accident upon the principle that the children were 
in fact invitees of Stonestorm on the play area and, 
therefore, Stonestorm was required to use ordinary 
care for their safety. Such care would not be met 
by permitting in the area a ramp which would at· 
tract children and which ramp was unsafe for them. 
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Permitting a ramp with loose boards where it was 
reasonable to assume that children would go could 
be held to be lack of ordinary care." 
The court in that case said also that decisions provid-
ing liability in such situations are based upon the general 
principle that the person in possession of the premises 
must take such precautions for the safety of his invitees as 
are reasonable under all the circumstances, considering 
their relation, the burden of the interference with his 
own affairs and the danger to the invitees to be antici-
pated, and that special caution is required in behalf of 
invitees of immature age, whose inability to appreciate 
and prospensity to ignore certain dangers he ought to 
consider. 
The pipe railings in the case at bar were ineffective 
to keep children from playing on the grass, but instead 
were a constant temptation for the children to play on the 
railings themselves. The grass was five to six years old at 
the time of the accident, and it was customary and allow-
able for children to play on it. Indeed, the railings had 
not only become useless, but were an eyesore, had an ad-
verse effect on the value of the property, and some of the 
railings were ultimately removed by the defendants m 
order to improve the saleability of the property. 
RESTATEMENT OF LAW OF TORTS Vol. 2 Sec. 
339 states that the possessor of land is subject to liability 
for bodily harm, even to trespassing children, caused by 
an artificial condition which he maintains upon the land, 
when the conditions quoted from the Restatement in the 
Edler case, supra, exist, including when: 
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"(d) the utility to the possessor of maintain-
ing the condition is slight as compared to the risk 
of young children involved therein." 
Defendant was maintaining a nuisance in this case 
because the pipe railing was a disadvantage to him and 
had completely lost any utility it may have had in the 
beginning. It was out of repair and a continuing threat 
to the bodily safety of children who were lawfully playing 
in the area, and the cost of removal, which was to the 
advantage of the owner, was negligible. 
See also PETERSEN v. CRAWFORD (1942) 34 
N.Y.S. 2d 91 and MARTINEZ v. PINKASEEWICS (1935) 
180 A. 153. 
In the case of O'DRISCOLL v. METRO POLIT AN 
LIFE INSURANCE COMPANY (1942) 33 N.Y.S. 2d 557 
the court said: 
"The act of the defendant landlord in attempt-
ing to protect a grass plot in what was apparently 
the common courtyard of its apartment building 
by installing sharp spikes on top of the wire fence, 
where to its knowledge, the tenant's children were 
accustomed to play a game of 'tightrope' by walk-
ing on the fence was held not only to show negli- ' 
gence but to constitute a nuisance, so as to render 
the defendant liable for injury to one of the ten· 
ant's children who attempting to walk on the 
spikes fell on them and was injured, even though 
the defendant landlord had warned the children 
not to play on the fence. In that case the injured ' 
child was seven years of age. The court further 
said. 
8 
"There is an important question that concerns 
us here and that question is whether or not the per-
mitting of these pickets to be placed on the fence 
was such a dangerous hazard, knowing the pro-
pensity of children to play thereabouts as to consti-
tuting a nuisance arising out of the continuous op-
eration of a negligent act. With the knowledge 
of the propensity of children to play thereabout as 
is evident from the testimony, I am of the opinion 
that the maintenance of this fence with the pickets 
thereon was a negligent act and more so a nuis-,, 
ance .... 
"The low, metal fence on the south side of the 
entrance of defendant's apartment house cemented 
by metal pointed spikes, upon which this seven 
year old child fell, created an unsafe condition of 
the premises for the 3 5 child population of the 
apartment house. Plaintiff's proof of injury not 
only to herself but to other small children of ten-
ants of the house, despite admissions of warning by 
the superintendent not to play on the fence, made 
out a prim a facia case. The utility, to the possessor 
of maintaining the condition is slight as compared 
to the risk to young people involved therein." 
In the case of SMITH v. SPRINGMAN LUMBER 
COMPANY (Ill.) 191 NE 2d 256, a seven and one-half 
year old child lived with her family in an apartment dwell-
ing owned by the defendant. A fuel oil tank which was no 
longer in use was located next to a tree in the side yard 
of the premises and about 15 feet from the apartment 
building. The tank rested upon concrete blocks, was 
rounded on top. It was agreed by the parties that there 
was no physical defect in the tank itself. Children living 
in the apartment house played around the tank, climbed 
upon it, and climbed from it into the adjoining tree. The 
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minor plaintiff climbed on the tank and while attempting 
to climb into the tree slipped and fell to the ground and 
was injured. The defendant contended that there was no 
evidence that a dangerous agency existed. The case relied 
on a former landmark Illinois case of KAHN v. JAMES 
BURTON COMPANY, 126 NE 2d 836. In that case a 
child was injured while playing upon a lumber pile in 
an adjoining lot. A new home was being constructed on 
the lot by the defendant construction company and the 
lumber had been piled upon the lot by them. The court 
said: 
"The creator of certain conditions dangerous 
and hazardous to children because of their im· 
mature appreciation of such dangers and hazards 
must be held to an ordinary standard of conduct 
for the protection of such children in accordance 
with the attendant circumstances and conditions. 
Account must be taken of the cause and burden of 
taking precautionary measures and of the right of 
families and society to rear and develop children 
with freedom of activity in their communities with· 
out being subject to unreasonable risks which 
1 
might cause serious injury or death to such chil-
dren." 
In applying the rule of the Kahn case the court stated 
that the question was not whether the oil tank was defec· , 
tive but whether because of the defendant's knowledge 
that children played upon it, it was likely to cause injury 
to children. 
See also DOUD v. HOUSING AUTHORITY OF 
THE CITY OF NEW ARK (N.].) 183 A.2d 149 where a 
small child was injured when his scooter left the smooth 
sidewalk and ran over adjoining uneven cinder blocks 
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which had been put down as a walkway at the end of the 
sidewalk. It was held that the defendant could have fore-
seen that a child would ride his scooter off the smooth sur-
face onto the rough surface and be hurt and hence the duty 
arose. 
See also YAZZOLINO v. JONES (Cal.) 315 P.2d 107 
and COUGHLIN v. JONES 295 N.Y.S. 671. 
POINT NO. II 
SUMMARY JUDGMENT PROCEDURE IS 
DRASTIC AND SHOULD BE USED WITH 
CAUTION SO AS NOT TO BECOME A SUB-
STITUTE FOR AN OPEN TRIAL. 
In the case of RELIABLE FURNITURE COMP ANY 
v. FIDELITY AND GUARANTY INSURANCE UNDER-
WRITERS, INC. 16 UTAH 2d 211, 398 P.2d 685, Justice 
Crockett made the following observations: 
"The summary disposal of a case serves a 
salutary purpose in avoiding the time, trouble and 
expense of a trial when it is justified. But unless 
it is clearly so, there are other evils to be guarded 
against. A party with a legitimate cause, but who 
is unable to afford an appeal, may be turned away 
without his day in court; or, when an appeal is 
taken, if a reversal results and a trial is ordered, 
the time, trouble and expense is increased rather 
than diminished. It is to avoid these evils and to 
safeguard the right of access to the courts for the 
enforcement of rights and the remedy of wrongs by 
a trial, and by a jury if desired, that it is of such 
importance that the court should take care to see 
that the party adversely affected has a fair oppor-
tunity to present his contentions against precipitate 
action which will deprive him of that privilege. 
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His conten6ons as to the facts should be considered 
in the light most favorable to him, and only if it 
clearly appears that he could not establish a right 
to recovery under the law should such action be 
taken; and any doubts which exist should be re-
solved in favor of affording him the privilege of 
a trial. 
To the same effect is ROWLAND v. CHRISTIAN 70 
Cal. Rptr 97, 443 P.2d 561, 563 from which we quote as 
follows: 
"The summary judgment procedure is drastic 
and should be used with caution so that it does not 
become a substitute for an open trial. This court 
in two recent cases has stated: 'Summary judgment 
is proper only if the affidavits in support of the 
moving party would be sufficient to sustain a judg-
ment in his favor . . . and doubts as to the pro-
priety of granting the motion should be resolved in 
favor of the party opposing the motion. (Citing 
numerous cases.) ... A defendant who moves for 
a summary judgment must prevail on the basis of 
his own affidavits and admissions made by the 
plaintiff and unless the defendant's showing is 
sufficient there is no burden on the plaintiff to 
file affidavits showing he has a cause of action 
or even to file counter affidavits at all. A sum· 
mary judgment for defendant has been held im· 
proper where his affidavits were conclusionary and 
did not show that he was entitled to judgment and , 
where plaintiff did not file any counter affidavits. 
See also ROBISON v. ROBISON, 16 Utah 2d 
2, 394 P.2d 876. 
CONCLUSION 
The pipe railing which defendants installed and per· 
mitted to become wobbly and out of repair had long since 
lost any usefulness or advantage to the defendants in any 
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respect at the time the plaintiff minor sustained her crippl-
ing injury. Although the railing may have had some tem-
porary utility to protect newly planted grass in 1964, at 
the time of the injury in 1970 it was to the defendants' 
acknowledged advantage to remove it, as it had become 
unsightly and distracted from the value of the property. 
Its only remaining function was to provide energetic and 
enterprising children, inappreciative of the risks involved, 
with a wobbly and dangerous facility for "tightrope" 
walking. In the words of Justice Cardozo, "the danger to 
be perceived defines the duty to be obeyed". Certainly 
the defendants in the case at bar should not be heard to 
claim, as a matter of law, that they could not have reason-
ably foreseen the danger that was apparent to everyone 
else but the small children who were exposed to it and 
whose activities defendants were in a position to observe. 
The appellant respectfully urges this Court to reverse 
the summary judgment granted by the District Court, in 
order that the appellant may have a full opportunity to 
present all the evidence available to her to a jury, in ac-
cordance with her constitutional rights. ~ 
.. /.(!__ ___ =--···· day of 
WOODROW D. WHITE 
Attorney for Plaintiff 
and Appellant. 
